Planning of national energy policies brings new dilemmas with the introduction of distributed generators (DG). Economic theory suggests that a perfectly competitive market would lead to efficient pricing. In the absence of competition, regulators play a fundamental role in attracting reasonably priced finance in order to maintain, refurbish and increase the infrastructure and provide services at a reasonable cost. Energy market price equilibrium is mainly dependent on suppliers, generators, energy sources and demand, represented by conventional utility grid users. Its behavior is similar to that of other commodities. As generation becomes less centralized with the increasing economic viability of renewable energy sources, new suppliers are being connected to the grid. Such evolution means the transition from a monopolistic market to a broader and more open environment, with an increasing number of competitors. We make use of variational inequalities to model a hypothetical DG market in different scenarios, from monopoly, to oligopoly, to open market. Such an approach enables different equilibrium outcomes due to different DG penetration levels. Based on these findings, we argue that energy policies for such markets must be developed according to each specific stage of the grid's lifecycle. We show how energy policies and market regulations may affect such a transition, which may be catastrophic if not managed properly, and which is dependent on the energy mix. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.