In the aftermath of the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988 and the subsequent inquiry and recommendations made by Lord Cullen in 1990, there have been legislative changes and a renewed committment to safety by oil companies operating on the UK continental shelf (UKCS). Part of this new regime involves the preparation of a ＇safety case＇ for each installation operating on the UKCS. Details vary according to installation type and function, but, as a minimum, the safety case has to demonstrate that (i) the management systems comply with health and safety law; (ii) a regular independent audit of the management system has been provided for; (iii) potential hazards that can cause major accidents have been identified; and (iv) risks of major accidents have been evaluated and measures taken to reduce risks to personnel as far as is reasonably practicable. Much of the safety case depends on quantitative risk assessment to assess the effects of potential hazards to the installation and the personnel onboard; however, there is another side to risk estimates, namely the ＇qualitative＇ or subjective risk perceptions of the people who work and live offshore and are actually involved in hazardous offshore operations. These subjective perceptions of risk form the basis for risk acceptance, regardless of the objective or quantified risk, and, as such, they are important for understanding feelings of safety, attitudes to safety, risk-taking behaviour and accident involvement amongst the workforce. The present review considers psychological studies of offshore workers on UK and Norwegian installations and discusses how working environment and socio-organizational factors can affect risk perception and attitudes to safety, and ultimately risk-taking behaviour and accident involvement, within this unique and specialized work group.