IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, Vol.63, No.12, 4294-4300, 2018
Distributed Inertial Best-Response Dynamics
The note considers the problem of computing pure Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies in distributed (i.e., network-based) settings. The paper studies a class of inertial best-response dynamics based on the fictitious play (FP) algorithm. It is shown that inertial best-response dynamics are robust to informational limitations common in distributed settings. Fully distributed variants of FP with inertia and joint strategy FP (JSFP) with inertia are developed and convergence is proven to the set of pure NE. The distributed algorithms developed in the paper rely on consensus methods. Results are validated using numerical simulations.
Keywords:Best-response dynamics;distributed control;fictitious play (FP);game theory;joint strategy fictitious play (JSFP);potential games;pure nash equilibria (NE)