Deregulation and re-regulation of California's electricity market not only failed in terms of anticipated cost reductions, improved customer service and higher competition, it also led to the introduction of various additional energy subsidies. This paper analyzes California's electricity market deregulation process from a subsidy viewpoint. Under deregulation in California, investor-owned utilities were not allowed to pass their energy procurement costs fully on to their customers, and therefore subsequently, and inevitably. ran into severe financial problems. Such retail price regulation is an energy subsidy that is both economically and environmentally unfavorable, because it veils true price signals to electricity consumers and, in this way, discourages energy conservation. Other policies implemented in California that represent perverse energy subsidies are the purchase of power by the state of California, the Suspension of retail competition, and the potential misuse of money front the recovery of stranded costs. Many interventions implemented by the state to smooth out the impacts of the energy crisis insulated electricity consumers from market realities, supported the existing structure of California's electricity market, which is predominantly based on fossil fuels, and suppressed market incentives to improve energy conservation.