The present paper provides a game theoretic analysis of strategic cooperation on safety and security among chemical companies within a chemical industrial cluster. We suggest a two-stage sequential move game between adjacent chemical plants and the so-called Multi-Plant Council (MPC). The MPC is considered in the game as a leader player who makes the first move, and the individual chemical companies are the followers. The MPC's objective is to achieve full cooperation among players through establishing a subsidy system at minimum expense. The rest of the players rationally react to the subsidies proposed by the MPC and play Nash equilibrium. We show that such a case of conflict between safety and security, and social cooperation, belongs to the 'coordination with assurance' class of games, and we explore the role of cluster governance (fulfilled by the MPC) in achieving a full cooperative outcome in domino effects prevention negotiations. The paper proposes an algorithm that can be used by the MPC to develop the subsidy system. Furthermore, a stepwise plan to improve cross-company safety and security management in a chemical industrial cluster is suggested and an illustrative example is provided. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.